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Introduction

some 5.5% in 2009, the 18th fastest in the
world.viii Aid money is flowing smoothly into
Rwanda, NGOs in part contributing to the
continuation of authoritarianism while working
in a difficult political environment. Between
2005 and 2006, overseas developmental
assistance (ODA) averaged “just over 14
percent of GDP,” while FDI accounted for .23%
and average savings accounted for -1.4% of
GDP. ix A great deal of caution is necessary for
the international donor community to avoid
supporting and prolonging authoritarian rule.
The international donor community must begin
to make concrete demands of the Rwandan
government to truly liberalize its political
sphere, in the interest of continuing stability.

Rwanda, despite successful post-conflict
economic growth, is an illiberal shell of a
democracy as a result of unsuccessful postconflict democratization and liberalization. The
2003 constitution calls for the “eradication of
ethnic, regional and other divisions and
promotion of national unity.”vii Peaceful
elections have been held, but they merely
provide the illusion of democracy. Any
significant political threat to the regime is
labeled a “divisionist” and legally barred from
competition with Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic
Front, or RPF. The post-conflict path taken in
Rwanda has resulted in the country’s slide
towards authoritarianism. While some analysts
argue that limitations on civil liberties,
controlled political participation, and a closely
monitored press are necessary in post-conflict
environments to ensure stability in a postconflict state, by maintaining Rwanda as an
exclusionary pseudodemocracy, the Rwandan
elite are running a serious risk of inviting further
acute violence in the future.

Rwanda offers a unique opportunity to
apply post-conflict development theories.
Fifteen years after genocide, the guilty and the
innocent must continue to exist side-by-side in
the same country and neighborhoods.
Economically, it has rebounded fairly
successfully. Politically, however, Rwanda is a
far cry from a free, liberal democracy. A
question that post-conflict specialists often face
today is whether to focus on democracy in the
form of elections, or on peace and stability. If
liberalization takes a back seat to stability, how
long can a ruling party continue to maintain a
closed system before outsiders become
radicalized, once again putting stability at risk?
Is there a proper “sequence” for the building of
a liberal democracy? Is there a trade-off

The 1994 Genocide and the associated
collapse of the social order in Rwanda left a
major impact on the state and its people.
However, just as before the Genocide, the
international aid community is currently
praising Rwanda as a rare Central African
success. All the numbers look good. Before
taking into account the current global financial
crisis, the Rwandan GDP was expected to grow
77
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between democracy and stability? The case
study of Rwanda involves the recovery from
violence that reached an abhorrent extreme, and
thus serves as a highly complex and very
interesting test environment for the application
of these current post-conflict theories and offers
some answers for the questions they raise. This
will also generate policy recommendations for
the international community, NGOs, and
policymakers in Kigali.

democracies do not fight one another, the
process of democratization is a rough and
complex period, in which the risk of violence,
both external and internal, actually increases
significantly. Mansfield and Snyder noted that
states going from full transition from complete
authoritarianism to extensive mass democracy
are “twice as likely to fight wars in the decade
after democratization.”xii Subsequent work by
Paul Collier delivers empirical evidence
affirming the connection between
democratization and internal conflict. According
to Collier, “democracy, at least in the form it
has usually taken to date in the societies of the
bottom billion, does not seem to enhance the
prospects of internal peace. On the contrary, it
seems to increase proneness to political
violence.”xiii

Post-Conflict Democratization and the
Democratic Peace
From the mid-1990s onward, elections
were viewed as a major step towards success by
policy-makers in post-conflict environments.
For practical and logistical reasons, elections
gave the statebuilding process a point where
success could be claimed and the exit strategy
could be pursued. In academia, this belief was
not as widely accepted, but did gain a following.
Elections became a major benchmark and
indicator of the relative success of a given
statebuilding mission. The acceptance of
elections as a key part of post-conflict
reconstruction was in part a result of the
welcome adoption of Democratic Peace Theory
by former U.S. President Bill Clinton.x

A substantial argument emerged in the
1990s that elections do not imply liberal
democracy, and to believe otherwise is
dangerous. As Fareed Zakaria wrote, “While it
is easy to impose elections on a country, it is
more difficult to push constitutional liberalism
on a society. The process of genuine
liberalization and democratization is gradual
and long-term, in which an election is only one
step.”xiv Lessons learned in Iraq and
Afghanistan, both places where elections and
violence exist side-by-side, lend credence to this
viewpoint. The Democratic Peace Theory only
applies to consolidated democracies, and
therefore cannot be used to predict or
understand the behavior of states undergoing the
tumultuous process of post-conflict
democratization.

Democratic Peace Theory holds that
developed, liberal, or “consolidated”
democracies do not engage one another in
violent conflict. Applied to post-conflict
development, this theory implied that if
democracy and elections were made a priority
objective, international peace would logically
follow. Policymakers largely subscribed to this
belief during the planning and carrying out of
statebuilding operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.xi

Democracy v. Stability
Contemporary post-conflict development
theorists largely acknowledge that democracy
and elections are not equivalent and that the
goals of democratization and those of peace

This focus on elections delivering peace
vis-à-vis the democratic peace was misplaced.
While it may be true that consolidated
78
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democratizing states move towards liberal
democracy in a safe manner?

building and security enhancement may differ.
Scholars such as Jack Snyder have firmly
established that not “all good things go
together” as once believed. Democratization and
peacebuilding efforts can often have opposite,
contrary, and even opposing goals and
practices.xv For example, in a post-conflict
situation where violence was very recently a
legitimate means to air social grievances, the
premature holding of elections may result in
disappointed political losers returning to armed
struggle, a case of democratization interfering
with peacebuilding. Conversely, peacebuilding
efforts intended to assuage potential spoilers
such as inclusion of rebel groups in the
democratization process can lead to difficult
problems with the holding of democratic, free,
and successful elections.xvi

Sequencing
One answer is provided by the theory of
sequencing. First made popular by Fareed
Zakaria, Edward Mansfield, and Jack Snyder,
sequencing does away with the viewpoint that
immediate development of democratic elections
is always a good thing, and instead proposes
that national elections with universal suffrage
should wait until the rule of law and a wellfunctioning state is in place.xviii The sequencing
strategy views democracy as a long-term goal to
be strived for, not as something possible in the
short-term. Mansfield and Snyder write,
“Without reasonably effective civic institutions,
the outcome in culturally diverse societies is
likely to resemble Iraq and Lebanon. Once a
country starts on an illiberal trajectory, ideas are
unleashed and institutions are established that
tend to continue propelling it along that
trajectory. A key danger is that premature
democratization will push a country down this
path.”xix

Benjamin Reilly notes the “security
dilemma” which arises during elections after a
period of violent conflict, whereby “competing
ethnic, religious, and political actors will often
mobilize against the possibility of future threats,
triggering a cascading tit-for-tat escalation and
polarization from other segments of society. In
many cases, rising levels of internal conflict
have accompanied or been precipitated by
transitions from authoritarian rule toward
democracy. Despite their essential role, postwar elections have often fomented these
tensions, becoming a lightning-rod for popular
discontent and extremist sentiments.”xvii

Sequencing theorists believe that the
contestation and conflict of democratic elections
can serve as a spark that relights the flame of
violence in post-conflict societies. As violence
was very recently the primary choice to address
social grievances, a post-conflict state runs the
risk of devolving into further chaos. If the
original violence was ethnic in nature, early
democratization can have particularly damaging
consequences due to the process of
“outbidding,” which occurs where political
parties become extremely polarized, often on
ethnic grounds. As one political party
increasingly makes use of extremist rhetoric to
compete for votes, opposing parties respond in
kind, pushing both parties away from the center
while cancelling out the moderate voices of the

Therefore, a question of priority arises in
post-conflict situations. Is it better to have
democratic elections at the potential cost of
peace, or should democracy be held off until a
proper level of institutional support is in place?
And what exactly does “democracy” mean in
terms of concrete policy? If elections are not
one-in-the-same with democracy and may
actually be dangerous, then how can newly
79
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political center. Intense polarization and
othering causes a dramatic re-escalation of
social tensions, which can often result in the
breakdown of the democratic process and a
return to violence.xx

response to sequencing, Carothers proposes a
strategy he entitles “gradualism.”
Gradualism
Gradualism insists upon holding
elections, which are, for Carothers, the “core
element” of democracy; in a manner that is
“iterative and cumulative ways rather than all at
once.”xxiv Where sequentialism puts off
democratic elections until a stable rule of law is
in place, gradualism encourages the incremental
movement towards full and open elections while
simultaneously undergoing state-building
procedures. Carothers acknowledges the
seemingly minute difference between the two
strategies, but reaffirms the split between the
two is “fundamental.” Gradualism encourages
the taking of “incremental but definite steps”
toward a fully open political arena while at the
same time engaging in “statebuilding and rule of
law reforms.”xxv

Sequencing is a logical answer to the
failures of applying the democratic peace to
newly democratizing states. However, it too is
partially flawed. Responding to the early work
done by Zakaria, Mansfield, and Snyder,
Thomas Carothers argues that sequencing
theory rests on a “mistaken two part premise:
that a significant number of autocrats can and
will act as generators of rule-of- law
development and state-building, and that
democratizing countries are inherently ill suited
for these tasks.”xxi Carothers writes that the key
failure of sequentialism is allowing
authoritarianism to build democracy, a clearly
problematic approach. Carothers views
sequencing as an ideological practice of
“kicking the can down the road” and delaying
the development of free and fair elections
indefinitely, as sequentialism provides no firm
and clearly identifiable benchmarks for when a
state is “ready” for democracy. Additionally, he
is less pessimistic about the threat to stability
which democracy brings.xxii

Gradualism differs with sequentialism in
that it calls for simultaneous development of
state institutions and opening of the political
system, as opposed to delaying the latter until
the former has met some development
benchmark. It is overall a more optimistic
viewpoint on the democratization process.
While sequentialism theorists are prone to
characterizing democratization as inherently
very unstable and potentially chaotic,
gradualism sees the process as less sensitive and
explosive after the initial transition phase.
Gradualism does, however, agree with
sequentialism in that “democratization has no
natural place in the first phase, since this phase
is usually a conflictive, coercive process carried
out by strongmen leaders intent on conquest or
militarized defense.”xxvi Thus, gradualism
recognizes the need for some degree of delay
after a major conflict before elements of

Carothers also wrote that seqentialism
would be used by “traditional realists” in order
to excuse the maintenance of friendly relations
with autocratic governments, by “traditional
developmentalists” to re-ignite modernization
theory’s view that development must precede
democracy, and by “powerholders in some nondemocratic countries” to justify and excuse a
closed political system by claiming such a
situation is in the long-term interest of
democracy. Carothers believes sequencing to be
rooted in skepticism about democracy’s
potential for success, rather than in hope.xxiii In
80
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democracy can be introduced, but does not
accept delay beyond a brief transitory period.

A further problem arises when
considering the implications for the
international aid regime. Writing on the topic of
the development community’s work in Rwanda
before and leading almost immediately up to the
1994 Genocide, Peter Uvin explained the
problem of developers hailing a state for sound
economic policies and holding regular elections,
while turning a blind eye to the actual political
climate of the state.xxix If merely holding
elections is the pre-requisite for receiving
development assistance from the international
community, the development enterprise is
indirectly assisting in the spread of
pseudodemocracy. Autocratic leaders can easily
put on an election for show in order to satisfy
international donors. When domestic elites
realize that elections are the only thing being
asked of them by the aid community, they will
gladly supply them. However, those entrenched
elites will often not go so far as to ensure these
elections are free and fair or abide by electoral
results. The international community must be
more willing to tie aid to concrete reforms and
liberalization of domestic politics.

The Dangers of “Elections = Democracy”
There is a general acknowledgement
within the post-conflict literature that the
process of democratization can cause further
violence in post-conflict settings. For
proponents of democratic sequencing, elections
are to be held off until a stable order and rule of
law exists. For sequentialists, elements of full
national elections, such as minor regional
electoral contests, ought to be introduced
gradually into a democratizing state. For both
camps, full-suffrage free and fair elections tend
to be portrayed as the “be all end all” of
democratization efforts. This has led to a belief
amongst policymakers and the broader
international community that elections are the
climax of post-conflict operations, and in
international peacebuilding efforts, elections
have often marked the successful completion of
an operation.
However, as Anna K. Jarstad points out,
“the first post-war election is often riddled with
violence and flawed election outcomes.”xxvii For
a multitude of reasons, including inadequate
infrastructure, poor security services, and lack
of democratic roots, the earliest elections in
most post-conflict environments are a far cry
from free and fair. Benjamin Reilly adds that,
“…many transition elections are now saddled
with unrealistic expectations to achieve goals
that are inconsistent and incompatible. A more
realistic and less ideological appraisal of
elections is required – one which recognizes that
elections can be potentially advantageous or
injurious to post-war democratization – and that
success is dependent on a careful consideration
of timing, sequencing, mechanics, and
administration issues.”xxviii

For these temporal and structural
reasons, elections are surely a poor benchmark
to determine the successful democratization of a
post-conflict state that has only very recently
escaped violence. A very serious danger to
liberal democratization has arisen, bolstered by
the international community’s willingness to
view elections and democracy as tautological.
What of the post-conflict state which, a decade
or two after major violence has subsided, is now
back on its proverbial feet, but the elite-inpower refuse to give up their autocratic control?
Realizing that the international community has
seemingly equated democracy with elections,
elites of such post-conflict states are offered the
choice of instituting a pseudodemocracy, and
illiberal democracies are born.
81
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Zakaria’s ideas to shed light on the issue of
classifying democratic regimes. He shows that
“democracy” is not one static state of being, but
instead, there is a scale of democracy, and
regimes can land from “Liberal Democracy, in
that they have a fairly liberal Freedom House
score of 2.0 or lower on the seven-point scale
averaging political rights and civil liberties” to
“Politically Closed Authoritarian, which do not
have any of the architecture of political
competition and pluralism,” and anywhere inbetween.xxxii Such categorization has proven
useful to post-conflict theorists in that they help
theorists move beyond the ideological trappings
that elections imply a democracy which can
only be a positive development.

Illiberal Democracy
Fareed Zakaria coined the term “illiberal
democracy” in a 1997 piece that appeared in
Foreign Affairs. In this piece, Zakaria separates
democracy from constitutional liberalism, and
explains the danger of the first without the
latter.xxx Simply put, democracy without
liberalism is easily manipulated and controlled,
ensures the public few if any basic rights, and
features a tightly controlled political arena.
The elite of illiberal democracies have
realized that holding regular elections is an
important social norm in the modern state
system, and carries with it a certain amount of
prestige. However, without the various
freedoms that are guaranteed by liberal
constitutionalism, the democratic process is
easily corrupted by the state. As scholar Larry
Diamond writes, “First, more regimes than ever
before are adopting the form of electoral
democracy, with regular, competitive,
multiparty elections. Second, many of these
regimes—indeed, an unprecedented proportion
of the world’s countries—have the form of
electoral democracy but fail to meet the
substantive test, or do so only ambiguously.”xxxi
Thus, illiberal democracies have all the window
dressings that allow them to appear democratic
in form, but a closer analysis will reveal their
illiberal nature.

Post-Conflict Democratization Theory and
Illiberal “Slipping”
In a post-conflict setting, the dangers of
a regime slipping into the realm of illiberal
democracy are particularly salient. Current postconflict theory advocates the delay of major
elections until the state in question is capable of
supporting elections peacefully. However, there
is the ever-looming threat of authoritarian elite
becoming entrenched, embracing the illusion of
democracy in order to placate the international
community while enacting domestic reforms at
an excruciatingly slow pace, all the while citing
the work of sequencing scholars and claiming
the slow speed of reform is in the good interest
of democracy.xxxiii

Separating democracy from liberalism
has proven an extremely important step in the
process of categorizing and analyzing
democratizing states. Analysts that have
abandoned the fallacy that democracy alone is
the pinnacle of development are more capable
of rational assessment of the true political
conditions within a state. Work by Larry
Diamond, who uses the term “hybrid
democracy” to carry the same meaning as
Zakaria’s “illiberal democracy,” has used

As Carothers writes, “Prescribing the
deferral of democracy—and consequently the
prolongation of authoritarian rule—as a cure for
the ills of prolonged authoritarianism makes
little sense.”xxxiv Just as early elections can
cause a democratization process to become
abortive before it truly has a chance to succeed,
putting democratic reforms on the back burner
for too long can result in the development of a
82
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democracy that has no roots in liberal
constitutionalism. Instead, entrenched elites will
utilize elections merely as a show for the benefit
of its image to the international community and
aid organizations.

post-conflict literature to Rwanda will uncover
answers about the dilemmas that have arisen in
that body of work. Splitting the Rwandan
Recovery into four periods will allow for a more
straightforward analysis and application of postconflict development questions of sequencing,
order, and priority.

An Untouched Temporal Issue
Sequentialism and gradualism raise a
second important issue: how quickly must
pressure be applied to post-conflict states in
order to assure the growth of liberal democracy?
Without offering any major concrete solutions
of his own, Carothers does highlight a major
flaw of the early sequentialism works in that
they offer few universally applicable
benchmarks for the beginning of full-suffrage
elections in newly democratizing states.xxxv
Post-conflict democratization becomes a
balancing act, wherein the threat of excessively
early elections must be cast against the problem
of delaying elections indefinitely and potentially
excusing autocratic rule, which does little to
promote democratic development and may reignite acute violence in the long run by
preventing the airing of legitimate opposition
grievances.

Post-Colonial Rwanda: 1960 – 1994
In 1959-1960, a Hutu “revolution,”
assisted by the Belgian colonizers, replaced the
originally favored Tutsi monarchy with an
independent republic dominated by southern
Hutu. In 1973, Juvenal Habyarimana took
power in a coup d’état and diverted power to the
northern Hutu. Hundreds of thousands of Tutsi
fled the country as refugees. During this era, the
electoral politics of Rwanda became firmly
established as an exercise of ethnic
demography. The colonial interpretation of
Rwandan politics as firmly Hutu/Tutsi in nature
had taken hold.xxxvi
By 1990, the Tutsi population in exile
had created a sizable rebel force, known as the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). In late 1990,
the RPF invaded Rwanda with initial military
success. However, the Habyarimana regime
received considerable international support, and
the RPF shifted into guerilla-style combat,
which it waged effectively. When locally
arbitrated peace negotiation attempts failed, the
United States, France, and the Organization of
African Unity moved in to mediate an
agreement between the Rwandan government
and the RPF guerilla movement.

Rwanda provides a unique environment
upon which to apply the questions that linger
unanswered in the post-conflict community. As
the state suffered near-total collapse during the
Rwandan Genocide of 1994, it certainly
qualifies as a post-conflict setting. As the
violence was of an ethnic nature, it can be
expected that the post-conflict government
would want to delay democratic reforms in the
interest of state stability. Fifteen years after the
Genocide, Rwanda certainly falls into the
category of post-conflict states that have
delayed true liberal democratic reforms and
have witnessed “slipping” into the realm of
democratic authoritarianism. Therefore,
applying the questions presented by current

The Arusha talks lasted from July 1992
through August 1993. The final document called
for a cease-fire on both sides, inclusionary
power sharing in a transitional government, the
creation of nationally unified armed forces, and
the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs).xxxvii The implementation of the
83
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Arusha Accords was anathema to the Rwandan
Hutu elite and particularly to the Akazu, a group
of powerful Hutu extremists. The elections
called for in the Accords were clearly a threat to
the entrenched order in Rwanda. The fear that
the Accords would cause a dramatic change in
the domestic political balance of power was one
of many factors in the Akazu’s decision to turn
to Genocide in order to protect Hutu extremist
domination of Rwanda.xxxviii Such a fear of
elections would continue to play a major role in
Rwandan politics even after the Genocide was
brought to an end.

scholarship now provides on the dangers of
immediate democratization efforts after a major
conflict, especially when that conflict was
ethnic in naturexlii, this was an understandable
choice.
If the Rwandan leadership had been
pressured to make immediate moves towards
democracy, the rise of political polarization on
ethnic grounds would likely have been
disastrous for the country and may have reignited acute violence. A transitional period
with elections scheduled a decent time in the
future was clearly the safest method to help
ensure peaceable democratization in Rwanda’s
medium-to-long term. During the transitional
period, the RPF, who largely controlled the
transitional government, applied this theory to
an extreme.

Rwanda: Early Post-Conflict Transition 19942001
The post-conflict timeline in Rwanda
begins immediately after the RPF disposed of
the Hutu government responsible for carrying
out the Genocide. The transitional government
called for by the Arusha Accords was set up,
with the RPF and its allies appointing the
leadership. Elections were to be delayed until
2003xxxix. The Tutsi-led RPF banned former
President Juvenal Habyarimana’s party, the
Mouvement Républicain National pour la
Démocratie et le Développement, or MRNDD,
and placed Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, into the
office of the president, while Paul Kagame, who
served as the head of the RPF’s military force,
served in the role of Defense Minister. xl Mr.
Kagame was believed to have a great deal of
influence during Mr. Bizimungu’s tenure, and
Kagame assumed power after Bizimungu was
forced to resign following accusations of tax
fraud.xli

The RPF Strategy: Sequentialism to an
Extreme
In a 1995 interview, RPF leader and
current President of Rwanda Paul Kagame
outlined his views on the risk that early
democratization would re-spark the ethnic
violence that had torn Rwanda apart. His
viewpoint is very similar to the post-conflict
democratization experts who have written on the
violent consequences of too-early
democratizationxliii.
If you try to organise elections, to
authorise parties to grow like
mushrooms and allow competition, you
will be making an even bigger problem
for yourself than the one you already
have: dividing people who are already
divided. What does the multi-party
system mean in our African societies?
That I will use every tactic to distinguish
myself from my neighbour with the aim
of winning more votes than he
wins…you will never have a united
country. We will never have democracy:

Thus, in Rwanda, a transitional
government was set up and full-suffrage
elections were postponed for nine years.
Decision-makers in post-conflict Kigali clearly
chose stability rather than immediate
democracy. Given the insights that post-conflict
84
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people will pounce on each other. One
party would emerge to defend those who
perpetrated the genocide, then another
would arise saying that members of the
former should be tried…You would
have a great war. We must analyze the
problems that are in store for us and
those that we are going to solve.xliv

were still banned from open operations in the
Rwandan political sphere, all contestants in the
election had to run without party support.
However, as the RPF had unscrupulously taken
advantage of the transitional, “party-free” period
to campaign, they also implicitly supported
candidates in these elections. A Human Rights
Watch report on these early democratic
elections considered this election “flawed from
the beginning,”xlvii due to the unfair advantages
taken by RPF party organizers, the purposeful
delaying of international observers, and the lack
of a secret ballot.

Clearly, Kagame’s view of post-conflict
development for Rwanda, which became very
much the viewpoint of the RPF, is a version of
extreme sequentialism. Explicitly, the RPF
engaged in purposefully delaying the
development of multi-party elections in order to
ensure a peaceful transition period. Implicitly,
however, the RPF manipulated this strategy in
order to take advantage of the time afforded it to
conduct grassroots campaigning operations so
that it may continue its dominance of Rwandan
politics when the transition period finally came
to a close.xlv Thus, an unintended consequence
of sequentialism is discovered. Delaying the full
opening of the political process until certain
preconditions are met allows a party in power to
take advantage of its superior placement in the
political sphere to gather strength in a
potentially unfair manner compared to lesser
groups that may become legitimate opposition
parties after the transition period has come to a
close.

The Constitutional Reform of 2001-2003
Despite this less than free and fair
election, the Rwandan government began the
process of drawing up a new, permanent
constitution. The Constitutional Commission,
which was provided for by the Arusha
Agreement, was set up in late 2000 on the basis
of law number 23, issued in late December of
1999. The National Assembly of Transition
(NAT) appointed the Commission’s president,
Tito Rutaremara, in late November of 2000. The
other members of the Commission had been
appointed in July of 2000 by the NAT, resulting
in the political composition of the Commission
mirroring that of the NAT.xlviii The
Commission’s objective was to provide
proposals and eventually a draft of a permanent
constitution to lawmakers in Kigali based upon
consultations with the Rwandan public. The
draft Constitution was then to be made into law
through a national referendum, which was held
on May 25, 2003 with an affirmative
outcome.xlix

Democratization Efforts prior to Constitutional
Reform
As the end of the transitional
government’s accepted tenure drew to a close,
the transitional government began instituting
some democratic measures. In early March of
2001, local elections were held. These elections
were considered by observers to be sloppily
organized and of “Byzantine complexity,”
which allowed “RPF placemen to exercise full
control over the process.”xlvi As political parties

However, doubts have been cast on the
true effectiveness of the Commission in this
regard. As the RPF-dominated Transitional
Government was responsible for the education
of the masses, they were able to easily
85
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manipulate the Rwandan public into repeating to
the Commission exactly what the RPF wanted
to be emplaced in a new Constitution, a clear
manipulation of the process.l

The constitutional reform process, which
was heavily guided by the hand of the RPF,
resulted in a document that was “tailor-made to
legitimize the regime.”lv Just as the RPF took
advantage of the transition period to conduct
grassroots campaign operations, it took
advantage of its position of power during the
reform process to ensure the creation of a
document that would be most capable of
securing RPF rule in a potentially hostile
electoral climate. Article 9 includes language
that calls for “eradication of ethnic, regional and
other divisions and promotion of national
unity,” which can and has been used as a
method of neutralizing the RPF’s political
opposition.lvi The governing of political parties
is exceptionally strict, and the divisionism
language can be utilized by the RPF to deny the
right to organize to any party that may pose a
political threat. Here, we see another failing of
waiting to begin major democratic reforms for
too long. When the time for those reforms
comes, the incumbent party-in-power can
manipulate the process in order to serve their
long-term goals, hijacking the process of
democratization for its own ends.

The Rwandan Constitution of 2003
establishes a unique set of rules for a system of
government. Kagame and the RPF can certainly
be praised for including direct universal suffrage
and secret ballot elections. The “Burundi
effect,” a name given to the ethnicity-based
voting which took place in Burundi, caused
Tutsi elite in the RPF to fear universal suffrage,
as they was unsure of the party’s ability to
attract rural Hutu votes. The fearful Tutsi elite
added considerable pressure on the rest of the
RPF to limit the electorate in order to assure its
continued position in a place of power, but
ultimately the decision was made in favor of
full-suffrage voting.li Praise is also due the
language that “ensures that women are granted
at least thirty per cent of posts in decision
making organs,”lii which has been sustained by a
quota-based election sysem.
However, as the constitutional reform
process was all but dominated by the interests of
the RPF, those interests are clearly and strongly
reflected in the final product. The Rwandan
Constitution of 2003 includes extremely strict
guidelines for the activities of political parties as
well as for individual politicians. While the
Constitution explicitly allows a “multi-party
system of government,”liii it also allows the
national legislature to call any political party
into question on various grounds of offensesliv
and send the matter to the judiciary, which can
decide the fate of the party. Party organization
at the local level is prohibited, which prevents
opposition movements from spreading
nationwide.

The Presidential Election of 2003
Along with the new Constitution, 2003
saw presidential and parliamentary elections
held as well. The process and result of these
elections helped to confirm Rwanda’s drift
towards RPF-led authoritarianism.lvii The
elections themselves were marred by political
arrests, disappearances, and voter intimidation.
International observers sent by the European
Union witnessed cases of irregularities and
fraud at 374 out of 10,000 voting stations
visited. However, those international reporters
found it was not fraudulent election day
practices which secured an RPF victory, but
rather it was the RPF using “its hold of the
state’s administrative and military power to

Critiquing the Constitutional Reform Process
and Product
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exert various forms of influence on potential
voters” which did so, a process that “started
long before the electoral campaign.”lviii While
the elections themselves were fairly clean, their
results were the product of a campaign of voter
intimidation carried out by the RPF.

legal confines of the 2003 Constitution and
maintaining the façade of multi-party
democracy. A 2003 report done by the African
Capacity-Building foundation has found that
“although the political discourse of the
Rwandan authorities emphasizes reconciliation,
national unity, and the respect for the rights for
all, the government has been in the grip of a
hazardous authoritarian drift.”lxii Since the
passing of the 2003 constitution and the
beginning of democratic elections, the RPF has
maintained an increasingly tight hold on the
political arena. Elections have not made the RPF
more receptive to the demands of its electorate,
but have instead required the RPF to tighten its
grip in order to keep its hold on political power
in the face of a potentially hostile electorate, as
the Rwandan countryside is majority Hutu.lxiii

The results of the elections were
lopsided. RPF leader Paul Kagame won the
presidential contest with 95% of the vote, and
the RPF took 74% of the legislature. Other
minor parties had supported Kagame’s
presidential run, and therefore represent allies in
an RPF-dominated alliance.lix Thus, the 2003
democratic elections resulted in a legitimization
of the RPF rule that had dominated Rwandan
political life since the end of the Genocide in
1994.
Rwanda 2003-Present: An Economic Success
Slipping Towards Authoritarianism
Considering Rwanda’s status as a postGenocide state, the country has seen remarkable
economic growth. Before the shockwaves of the
global financial crisis began to impact Rwanda,
the International Monetary Fund forecast it to
witness 8.5% growth in 2008.lx According to a
report from the United Nations Development
Project, poverty rates remain high at 56.9%, but
that figure is a marked decrease from the preconflict figure of 70%. That same report credits
Rwanda with the decline of infant mortality
rates, an increase in primary school enrolment,
and “significant progress in the area of peace
and reconciliation, restoration of law and order,
and democratization.”lxi

The Constitution that was designed by
the RPF and for the RPF has served its function
perfectly by providing legal methods that
castrate and neutralize any significant
opposition. A favorite tactic of the RPF to
achieve this goal is through accusing the
opposition of divisionism. The language
allowing the calling into question of political
parties is particularly devastating to the process
of liberal democratization when combined with
Article 9’s call for the “eradication of ethnic,
regional and other divisions and promotion of
national unity.”lxiv Part of the RPF democratic
training literature included the official RPF
doctrine on political parties, which includes that
“the parties must avoid sowing the seeds of
divisionism among Rwandans.”lxv

With such remarkable economic success,
one would hope for an equal or greater success
in the field of liberal democratization.
Unfortunately, just the opposite has unfolded.
The RPF has pursued a course of action that has
systematically eliminated all credible
opposition, all while still working within the

Thus, the RPF can easily do away with
any potentially threatening opposition
movements by claiming they are acting out of
step with the government line towards a unified
Rwanda and are therefore divisionist, seeking
explicitly or implicitly to send Rwanda back
into violent chaos. Pasteur Bizimungu, the
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As Kristine Höglund wrote on the topic
of violence in war-to-democracy transitions,
“political violence is often a response to too
little democracy.”lxxii By preventing opposing
ideas from coalescing around legitimate and
included political parties that are then allowed
to participate in the process of governing, and
by forcing opposition leaders into exile, the
Rwandan government is dramatically increasing
its security risk. The International Crisis Group
found that the “excluded opponents generally
try and find allies and fight against the
government from the outside, thus increasing
the security threat.”lxxiii The efforts of the RPF
to monopolize its power and neutralize any
opposition groups have the negative
consequence of contributing numbers to an
ever-growing group of radicalized Rwandan
opposition-in-exile.

President of Rwanda during the 1994-2000
period, launched his own opposition political
party, the Party for Democracy and
Regeneration (PDR) in 2001. The Rwandan
government almost immediately banned the
PDR on the grounds that it was “divisionist,”
and Bizimungu was placed under house arrest,
and later sentenced to a 15-year prison term.lxvi
In the period of 1995-2003 alone, more than 40
Rwandan political leaders have been forced into
exile abroad. Former President Bizimungu
remained imprisoned until 2007.lxvii As of mid2000, about 80% of the “most important officeholders were RPF/RPA.”lxviii According to a
2003 report from the International Crisis Group,
in 2003, “11 out of 12 prefects are affiliated
with the RPF, the chief prosecutor, head of the
Court of Cassation and head of the
Constitutional Court are all RPF members, 8 out
of 9 Rwandan banks are managed by RPF
members, and all the institutes of higher
education are run by RPF members.”lxix

While much of the Rwandan Diaspora
after the 1994 Genocide was believed to be
comprised largely of Hutu genocidaires and
moderate Hutus who feared Tutsi vengeance,
more recent developments within Rwandan
exile groups suggest a more diverse
composition. Particularly telling is the creation
of Tutsi-led exile groups in the United States
and France who hold a “platform to fight against
the RPF’s drift towards authoritarianism.”lxxiv
The existence of Tutsi-led exile groups which
hold such a platform certainly contribute more
heavily to the argument that Rwanda has
suffered such a drift than exile movements of
purely Hutu composition. Many of these exile
groups are of a bi-ethnic character, and therefore
pose a problem to the RPF’s strategy of
accusing opposition movements of divisionism
on ethnic grounds.lxxv

Under the guise of “national
unity and security,”lxx the Rwandan government
effectively prevents the formation of any
legitimate and substantial political opposition
from arising. Politicians, both inside the RPF
and those members of other parties, are
“expected to remain in the same political
straightjacket.”lxxi While the 2003 Constitution
calls for multi-party democracy, the RPF is able
to circumvent this requirement by accusing
opposition parties and politicians of
“divisionism.” By doing so, the RPF is taking
advantage of the unique nature of post-Genocide
Rwanda. The excuse that any political
opposition would snowball into a re-ignition of
ethnic conflict is an illegitimate one for taking
legal action and shutting down all opposition
movements that may become politically
threatening to the RPF in the future.

There are still remnants of the extremist
Hutu genocidaires organized and operating on
the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s side of
the border between Rwanda and that country,

The Subsequent Threat to Security
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and their presence has a destabilizing effect on
peace in the region. However, there are also
moderate Hutu and opposition Tutsi exile
groups in the Great Lakes region that have
categorically recognized the genocide and wish
to bring about political reform in Rwandalxxvi.
The longer the RPF-controlled Rwandan
government prevents these groups from
becoming part of the legitimate political process
inside Rwanda, the greater the chance of these
groups radicalizing, giving up on peaceable
methods and turning to arms to achieve their
objectives of political reform. The post-conflict
literature recognizes the potential problems of
inclusion regarding spoilers, but as Kristine
Höglund writes, “inclusion in the political
process based on commitments to peaceful
means can be an important tool to prevent and
manage violence.”lxxvii Should the RPF wish to
work towards reducing Rwanda’s security risk,
it must begin the process of including political
groups which are willing to re-enter Rwandan
society on a peaceful basis.

government runs along those exact lines – the
fear of creating another “monster”lxxx means a
clampdown on all media which shows a hint of
independence from the official government line.
The press law passed in 2001 decrees that “Any
attempt, via the media, to incite a part of the
Rwandan population to genocide, is liable to the
death sentence.”lxxxi Just as the law that
prohibits “divisionism,” this law is but another
method of allowing the removal of opposition
voices through legal means.
During the transitional phase, some
independent press organizations had appeared
which took the RPF and the Rwandan
government to task on major issues. However,
the state began a crusade of intimidation tactics
that quickly put an end to this development.
Owners and journalists connected to
independent press outlets found themselves
victim of state-sponsored harassment,
intimidation, forced exile, and arbitrary
detainment.lxxxii A more recent technique is the
government’s insistence on a pre-requisite
amount of start-up capital to allow the licensing
of a new television station, radio station, or
newspaper. These required amounts are high to
the point of being prohibitive for the creation of
any new media outlets.lxxxiii

A Muzzled Press
The organizers of the Rwandan
Genocide were infamous for the use of hate
media to polarize ethnic tensions, spread the
message of genocide, and coordinate
genocidaire squads. Radio stations, notably the
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, or
RTLM, were particularly effective in a country
where literacy rates were staggeringly low,
limiting the impact of written press.lxxviii The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has
recognized the function of media in making the
Genocide possible on such a massive scale, and
has prosecuted three former RTLM figures. lxxix

The result of these laws is a highly
obedient and non-confrontational national press.
The media organizations that do exist have now
learned to practice self-censorship” out of fear
of being harassed, intimidated, attacked, or shut
down by the state. According to an annual
report written by the international press
freedoms watchdog Reporters Sans Frontiers,
one human rights worker “noted that it is more
appropriate to refer to ‘government media’ than
to ‘public media’.”lxxxiv During the 2003
elections, the media was barred from covering
elections at the provincial level and from

Given this record of abuse, it may seem
understandable that post-conflict Rwanda would
be hesitant to allow much in the way of press
freedoms. The excuse used by the Rwandan
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rule-of-law is in place.lxxxvii A competing view,
popularized by Thomas Carothers, is that of
“gradualism,” where universal suffrage national
elections should be delayed, but elements of
democracy must be gradually instituted in a
post-conflict society from the very beginnings
of peace.lxxxviii

hosting televised debates between candidates,
limiting their impact on the outcome.lxxxv
A Final Application of Post-Conflict Literature
The RPF-dominated government of
Rwanda has, since the end of the Genocide,
acted in ways to ensure the continuation of its
monopoly of power. Through the tactic of
labeling all opposition voices both inside and
outside of the political arena as “divisionist,” the
Rwandan government has effectively managed
to stifle any credible threat to its hold on the
political process. Elections are a thinly veiled
practice of legitimizing the RPF’s rule, done as
a show of modernism and development for the
enjoyment of the international community.
Contemporary Rwanda can be included as one
of Larry Diamond’s “Politically Closed
Authoritarian” states without too much trouble
for the classifier.lxxxvi Applying the post-conflict
arguments to Rwanda allows us to understand
those arguments more fully.

The case study of Rwanda strongly
supports further application of Carothers’ theory
of gradualism. The transitional Rwandan
government used the basic ideas of
sequentialism as a dodge and an excuse for its
illiberal activities, insisting that it was working
towards democratic reform while
simultaneously abusing its power to ensure that
when multi-party democracy became the policy
of Rwanda, it would be nothing more than a
façade designed to appeal to the demands of the
international community while having no real
impact on domestic Rwandan politics.
In effect, sequentialism gave the RPFdominated transitional government a window of
opportunity to abuse its position of power in
order to campaign, canvass, and recruit
members, all while other parties were prohibited
to do so. Additionally, when the transitional
phase drew to a close and the constitutionbuilding period began, the RPF manipulated the
process to ensure the document would be
“tailor-made”lxxxix to its interests and continued
monopoly of power.

In the trade-off between democracy and
stability, the Rwandan government clearly chose
a focus on the latter during the transitional
phase. Given the extraordinary and ethnic
character of the violence witnessed in Rwanda,
this was an understandable choice. In a nation
that had just recently seen ethnic tensions
polarized and exploited to a genocidal extent,
the inherent conflict which democracy brings
would have been too great a risk for transitional
Rwanda. In a post-conflict society, elections
must be held off until a point at which they
would not re-ignite major acute violence.

If gradualism had been the dominant
belief of post-conflict theorists and of the
international community, there is a chance the
policies of the transitional Rwandan government
would have reflected that belief. If certain
elements of democracy combined with gradual
liberalization and statebuilding had been the
norm for post-Genocide Rwanda, perhaps
contemporary Rwanda wouldn’t suffer from a
closed, authoritarian political system, while still

This segues into the second major
question in post-conflict democratization. To
reiterate, if elections must be held off, when can
they begin? An answer backed by Zakaria,
Mansfield, and Snyder is that of
“sequentialism,” wherein elections must be
delayed until pre-conditions such as a stable
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However, as the case of Rwanda clearly
demonstrates, the other side of this balance must
not be ignored. Should democratic reform be
placed on the proverbial back burner for too
long, post-conflict states run a serious risk of
slipping into the realm of illiberal democracies.
The theoretical argument that early
democratization is a danger to stability is a
positive contribution to post-conflict theory, but
more care needs to be taken to ensure that
autocratic leaders of post-conflict states are not
allowed to utilize that argument as an excuse to
delay the development of liberal democratic
reforms indefinitely.

being able to manage the threat to internal
stability which full-scale democracy can bring.
Another issue raised by contemporary
scholars of post-conflict societies is the danger
of a generally perceived notion in the
international community that elections are
identical to democracy.xc The case of Rwanda
clearly illustrates the pitfalls of such misguided
thinking. Multi-party democracy is embedded in
the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda and elections
are regularly scheduled and conducted, leading
the international community at large to assume
Rwanda features a democratic character.
The truth is that Rwandan elections are a
façade, and the political process is heavily
manipulated by the RPF to maintain its hold on
power in the face of increasing opposition. The
international community looks at Rwanda’s
successful economic growth and democratic-onpaper structure and green lights development aid
projects, loans, and grants, effectively
promoting the continuation of illiberal
democracy in Rwanda. As Peter Uvin pointed
out, a similar scenario existed during the years
immediately prior to the outbreak of genocide.
Thus, the view that democracy and elections are
one-in-the-same is a mistaken and potentially
fatally dangerous assumption.

Conclusion: Moving Forward
One of the most important contributions
of the post-conflict literature has been that
excessively early democratic reforms are
potentially disastrous to the peace, stability, and
security of a state that is just emerging from
violent conflict, and thus elections should not be
viewed as the primary indicator of progress in
the process of reconstruction. As there is
conflict inherent in any democratic elections,
such elections should be held off until a society
is more readily equipped to deal with that
conflict in a way that is healthy and non-violent.
However, as the early critics of this
thinking have pointed out,xci the existence of a
body of theory that calls for the delay of
democratic elections is a potentially dangerous
intellectual product. As the case study of
Rwanda indicates, that theory can be taken to an
extreme, used by authoritarian leaders to excuse
their continuance of illiberal policies. While this
is far from the intentions of the authors of recent
post-conflict theory, it is certainly an accidental
by-product that must be better guarded against
in the future.

Rwanda serves as a potent reminder to
the community of post-conflict theorists and
scholars that the temporal issue of
democratization is far from unimportant. Postconflict democratization is clearly a balancing
act between stability and democratic reforms.
The danger of pursuing democratic elections too
quickly after violent conflicts has been a hotly
covered issue as of late, perhaps gaining such
traction due to the faltering statebuilding efforts
of United States foreign policy in Afghanistan
and Iraq.

There is clearly a great deal more work
to be done in this highly relevant and relatively
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new field of scholarly work. More attention
must be called to the temporal and
administrative questions of democratization in
post-conflict societies, and additional thorough
analysis will help to better identify the right
balance between the delay of universal suffrage
national elections and the risk of slipping into
the realm of pseudodemocracy.

A presidential election is scheduled for
2010, as per the Constitution, which calls for
them once every seven years.xcv President
Kagame may run for a second term in these
elections, but, barring any alteration of the
constitution or Putin-style “sidestepping,” his
second term must be his last. The results of this
election will serve as an excellent barometer as
to the status of Rwanda. Should we see a repeat
of the 2003 elections, wherein Kagame won a
staggering 95% of the vote and the work of
international monitors was made exceedingly
difficult, it will be clear that little political
progress has been made, and Rwanda will still
be categorized as “Politically Closed
Authoritarian.”xcvi'

For Rwanda, it is time for the
international community to place additional
pressure on the government to liberalize the
political process. The ruling party is
manipulating and taking advantage of the
country’s past in order to stifle opposition
parties and muzzle the Rwandan free press.
While such tactics may be in the short-term
interest of the RPF, they create a very real
danger for the country in the long-term. By
undermining the growth of legitimate domestic
opposition groups, the Rwandan government is
running the risk of radicalizing the
opposition.xcii As violence is still relatively
recent in Rwanda’s history, it is not unthinkable
that such a radicalized opposition, after having
been driven underground, would turn to violent
means in order to bring about the political
change they desire.
Policymakers in Kigali need to
understand the risk of continuing along such
illiberal trends in a post-conflict state. A violent
society has an increased risk of returning to
violence.xciii While opening up the political
sphere may seem like an unattractive and
difficult option for such a dramatically
entrenched party, it will help reduce the risk that
is currently building in Rwanda. Successful
economic developmental statistics such as those
associated with Rwanda may cast a light of
doubt on such a grim prediction, but observers
must remember that Rwanda was in the good
favor of development specialists immediately
prior to the 1994 genocide as well.xciv
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